THE JOHN MARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

THE THIRD DOOR IS OFF THE HINGES: A PROSPECTIVE STUDY ON THE
EFFECTS OF THE CREATE ACT AGAINST FEDERAL PATENT POLICIES

SHANE M. POPP
ABSTRACT

The CREATE Act has amended § 103 of the Patent Act to expand the definition of
common ownership such that a claimed invention is deemed to be commonly owned
with other subject matter when the two arise from the same "joint research
agreement." With the CREATE Act, Congress intended to promote research among
inventive entities, but instead, Congress has relaxed the conditions for patentability
to the point where a contract can circumvent an obviousness inquiry.
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INTRODUCTION

On December 10, 2004, President Bush signed a piece of legislation entitled the
Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act (the "CREATE Act" or the
"Act").1 The purpose of the CREATE Act was to "promote cooperative research
involving universities, the public sector, and private enterprise."2 The CREATE Act
amends 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) by expanding the definition of the statutory phrase "owned
by the same person" to include parties subject to a "joint research agreement" if three
criteria are met: (1) The "joint research agreement was in effect on or before the date
the claimed invention was made"; (2) "the claimed invention was made as a result of
activities undertaken within the scope of the joint research agreement"; and (3) "the
application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is amended to disclose
the names of the parties to the joint research agreement."3 Additionally, within the
CREATE Act, the term "joint research agreement" is given a broad definition.
Specifically, "joint research agreement' means a written contract, grant, or
cooperative agreement entered into by two or more persons or entities for the
performance of experimental, developmental, or research work in the field of the
4
claimed invention."
* Mr. Popp is the in-house patent counsel at Agensys, Inc. in Santa Monica, California. The
opinions stated herein are those solely of the author and not of Agensys, Inc.
I Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108453, 118 Stat. 3596.
2_[d.
3 § 103(c) now reads:
(c)(1) Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior
art only under one or more of subsections (e), (H),and (g) of section 102 of this title,
shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and
the claimed invention were, at the time the claimed invention was made, owned
by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, subject matter developed by another
person and a claimed invention shall be deemed to have been owned by the same
person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person if(A) the claimed invention was made by or on behalf of parties to a joint
research agreement that was in effect on or before the date the claimed invention
was made;
(B) the claimed invention was made as a result of activities undertaken
within the scope of the joint research agreement; and
(C) the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is
amended to disclose the names of the parties to the joint research agreement.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the term 'joint research agreement' means
a written contract, grant, or cooperative agreement entered into by two or more
persons or entities for the performance of experimental, developmental, or
research work in the field of the claimed invention.

35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
4Id. § 103(c)(3).
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On the surface it appears that the CREATE Act will foster collaborative
research among various types of entities across the board. However, further
investigation reveals that the implementation of the CREATE Act may corrupt the
legislative purpose behind the Patent Act and ultimately prove to contravene the
constitutional policy behind the patent system when patents protected from
invalidity by the CREATE Act are enforced against third parties.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the CREATE Act in view of the
underlying purpose of the U.S. patent system. This analysis will reveal the Act to be
an undue shift in policy favoring contracts over patents.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1984, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 103 to include a second paragraph that
read:
Subject matter developed by another person which qualifies as prior art
only under subsection (f) or (g) of Section 102 of this title, shall not preclude
patentability under this section where the subject matter and the claimed
invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same
5
person or subject to an assignment to the same person.
This amendment, sometimes called the "Bass disqualifier," was enacted to
overcome the problems encountered in In re Bass6 and In re Clemens which held
that § 102(g) prior art and possibly § 102(f) prior art, although not known to the
public, may be used to sustain a rejection under § 103.8 The legislative history of the
1984 amendment shows that the amendment was specifically enacted to address the
Bass problem as well as "encourage communication among members of research
teams." 9
Subsequent to the 1984 amendment, § 103 explicitly made clear that any prior
art which qualifies under § 102(f) or § 102(g) could not be used in conjunction with
§ 103 if and only ifthe prior art was, "at the time the invention was made, owned by
the same person or subject to an assignment to the same person." Conversely, if the
prior art was not owned by the same person, then it could still be used to negate
patentability for obviousness in conjunction with § 103 as explicitly provided in
§ 103(a).1
5 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2000). Subsection (f) of § 102 states, "A person shall be entitled to a
patent ... unless he himself did not invent the subject matter sought to be patented." Id. § 102(f).
Subsection (g) states, "A person shall be entitled to a patent ... unless before [the applicant's]
invention thereof the invention was made in this country by [another] and not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed." Id. § 102(g).
G474 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
7622 F.2d 1029 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
8 Bass, 474 F.2d 1291; Clemens, 622 F.2d 1040.

9 130 CONG. REC. 28069, 28071 (1984).
1035 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). Section 103(a) states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosedor

described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
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In Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. MeCain Foods, Ltd., the Federal Circuit held a patent
for a process of making frozen, partially fried, lattice-shaped french fries invalid as
obvious.1
The district court found that two pieces of prior art (Matsler and Jayne)
protected by non-disclosure agreements "provided the motivation.., to combine the
known waffle-cut potato chips with the Strong patent process to produce frozen,
parfried, and reconstituted waffle fries."12 On appeal, the Federal Circuit declined to
explicitly rule on the issue of whether § 102(f) prior art could be used in conjunction
with § 103. The court explained that because the product of the Matsler and Jayne
disclosures was known to the public and the product was different from the process
itself, there was no need to address the issue. 13 The court further noted that it was
the process of making the french fries that was the subject of a nondisclosure
agreement and not the product itself.1 4 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court opinion.
In a dissent, Judge Newman stated, "§ 102(f) relates to 'derivation,' the taking of
the invention of another and patenting it as one's own. It is irrelevant whether or
not that invention is also prior art."15 The dissent relied on the foregoing reasoning
and a prior case in concluding that "§ 102(f) has no relevancy to what is 'prior art'
under

§ 103."16

Upon review of the district court opinion 17 and the Federal Circuit opinion, it
appears that the courts only analyzed whether the § 102(f) prior art was, "at the time
the claimed invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an
obligation of assignment to the same person," as required by § 103(c). The Federal
Circuit opinion set forth a factual timeline which showed that Matsler disclosed his
apparatus to Lamb-Weston in January 1980.18 However, after negotiations were not
fruitful with Lamb-Weston, Matsler decided to license his invention to J.R. Simplot
Company.19 In fact, discussions between Jayne and Lamb-Weston were terminated
in March 1980.20 The subject patent that was invalidated as obvious was filed in
August 1983 after several years of testing by Lamb-Weston. 21 Thus, the disclosures
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.

Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.
Id.(emphasis added).
11 78 F.3d 540, 545 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
12 Id.at 544.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15Id. at 549. The policy behind § 102(f) is reinforced by this statement. Additionally, by
reading § 103(a), this policy not only includes taking one's literal invention and patenting it as one's
own, but also patenting an obvious variation of another's invention. However, in an attempt to
foster greater communication between collaborators, the post 1984 Patent Act amendments made
clear that it is acceptable to patent obvious variations of others' inventions if the inventions were "at
the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an assignment to the same
person." 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(1) (2000).
16Lamb-Weston, 78 F.3d at 549 (quoting In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
17 Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wash. 1993).
18 Lamb-Weston, 78 F.3d at 542.
19 Id.

20 Id.
21 Id.
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of Matsler and Jayne were not commonly owned at the time the invention was made.
Accordingly, based on § 103(a), these disclosures could be used in an obviousness
determination. As such, the District Court and the majority on the Federal Circuit
22
found the invention obvious considering the prior art.
The conclusion reached in Lamb-Weston is sound given the purpose of the 1984
amendment to § 103. Essentially, Lamb-Weston took information that was disclosed
to it and attempted to patent an obvious variation of those disclosures. However, if
one assumes that negotiations had been fruitful with Matsler and Jayne, and the
rights to their respective disclosures were subject to assignment, Lamb-Weston
would most likely have been decided differently because the "common ownership"
provision of § 103 would have been satisfied.
In Oddzon Produet, Inc. v. Just Toy, Inc., the Federal Circuit addressed the
question that the Lamb-Weston decision left open. In Oddzon, the court held that
§ 102(f) references could be used in conjunction with an obviousness inquiry.23 In
that case, Oddzon, a toy manufacturer, sued several competitors for design patent
infringement as well as trade dress infringement and unfair competition. 24 One
defendant asserted invalidity of the design patent as a defense. 25 On a motion for
summary judgment the district court decided in favor of the patentee (Oddzon) on the
patent invalidity claim. 26 The competitor appealed the summary judgment. 27 The
Federal Circuit affirmed, stating, "[tihe district court ruled that two confidential ball
designs (the 'disclosures') which 'inspired' the inventor of the Oddzon design were
prior art for purposes of determining obviousness under § 103."28 The court went on
to state that
[w]hile the statute does not expressly state in so many words that § 102(f)
creates a type of prior art for purposes of § 103, nonetheless the conclusion
is inescapable; the language that states that § 102(f) subject matter is not
prior art under limited circumstances clearly implies that it is prior art
otherwise.29
Finally, the court provided the following disposition: "[wie settle the issue here
(subject of course to any later intervention by Congress or review by the Supreme
30
Court), and do so in the manner that best comports with the voice of Congress."
The two cases discussed above clearly show that (1) courts viewed the 1984
amendment to § 103 as a manifestation of legislative intent to encourage
communication between researchers and (2) subject to specific conditions, certain
prior art will fall outside the scope of a § 103 inquiry.

22

See id. at 545.

23

Oddzon Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403-04 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1400.

21

25 Id.
206Id.
27

28

29
30

Id.
Id.at 1401.

Jd
Id. at 1403.
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II. ENTER THE CREATE ACT

As previously discussed, the CREATE Act was intended to promote cooperative
research between public and private enterprises. But to what extent? Congress has
already passed legislation that would "encourage communication among members of
research teams." 31 With the CREATE Act, Congress appears to be drawing a fine
line between the communication of ideas and patentability. Careful analysis shows
that the implementation of the CREATE Act will invoke policies that traditionally
have taken a backseat to federal patent policy. The amendments of the CREATE Act
prevent subject matter that would otherwise qualify as prior art under § 102(e), (f)
and (g) from precluding patentability where the prior art was, "at the time the
invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an assignment to the
same person."

32

However, the CREATE act went on to further define the "common ownership
provision." Specifically, subject matter will be deemed to be owned by the same
person as the claimed invention if three conditions are met. First, the claimed
invention must have been made by parties to a joint research agreement that was in
effect on or before the date the claimed invention was made. 33 Second, the claimed
invention must have been made as a result of the activities within the scope of the
joint research agreement. 34 Third, the application must be amended to disclose the
names of the parties to the joint research agreement. 35 Finally, the Act defines the
term "joint research agreement" to mean, "a written contract, grant, or cooperative
agreement entered into by two or more persons or entities for the performance of
experimental, developmental, or research work in the field of the claimed
36
invention."
This definition is extremely broad. Moreover, careful drafting of contract
language could easily keep relevant subject matter and parties within the scope of a
"joint research agreement." This, of course, would deem the subject matter to be
commonly owned. Hence, the focal point of the CREATE Act is on the contractual
relationship between the parties and not the prior knowledge that the parties
possess.
It seems that Congress wants to encourage collaboration between researchers so
much that it redefined the concept of common ownership to include virtually any
contractual relationship. Although it is fundamentally sound to encourage scientific
research via contract, allowing contracts to serve as an avenue to circumvent the
Patent Act is contrary to the purpose behind the patent system which should take
precedence.
To show an example of the reach of the CREATE Act, suppose that a mid-sized
company (company X) in the highly competitive and lucrative field of widget
development wishes to embark on a new area of widget technology that it believes
will become a commercial blockbuster based on the need in the widget industry and
'3' See 130 CONG. REC. 28069, 28071 (1984) (discussing the purpose of the 1984 amendments to
the prior art provisions of the then current Patent Act).
3 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2005).

33 Id. § 103(c).
34 Id
3 Id5
36 Id. § 103(c)(3).
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the marketplace. Further assume that at the initial phase of research, company X
identifies a small start-up company and four universities with similar research. All
of the parties enter into a "joint research agreement" as defined by the CREATE Act.
Eventually, several patents issue on this technology. Each patent is an obvious
variation of the last. Over time, company X begins to enforce the family of widget
patents against other companies in the widget industry. Several competitors take
licenses. However, some companies decide to defend against the assertions of
infringement and assert invalidity as a defense to infringement. In addition, one of
the five members of the "joint research agreement" terminates the relationship and
company X sues for infringement.
In this hypothetical case, in light of the CREATE Act, is an assertion of
invalidity based upon obviousness in view of prior art subject matter developed by a
party to a joint research agreement still a viable defense to infringement of a patent
that was the fruit of that research agreement?

III. INVALIDITY BASED UPON OBVIOUSNESS AS A DEFENSE TO INFRINGEMENT: LICENSEE
ESTOPPEL AND ASSIGNOR-ESTOPPEL

In the landmark case of Lear v. Adkins, the Supreme Court held that a licensee
was not estopped from attacking the validity of a patent and was entitled to avoid
payment of all royalties accruing after the patent issued if the licensee could prove
invalidity of the patent. 37 In coming to the decision, the Supreme Court stated:
On the one hand, the law of contracts forbids a purchaser to repudiate his
promises simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he
has made. On the other hand, federal law requires that all ideas in general
circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a
38
valid patent.
The Court went on to balance the public policy behind contracts and patents:
Adkins' position would permit inventors to negotiate all important licenses
during the lengthy period while their applications were still pending at the
Patent Office, thereby disabling entirely all those who have the strongest
incentive to show that a patent is worthless. While the equities supporting
Adkins' position are somewhat more appealing than those supporting the
typical licensor, we cannot say that there is enough of a difference to justify
39
such a substantial impairment of overriding federal policy.
Upon finding that federal patent policy should prevail over contract policy, the
Court further stated that it was not clear that the previous court had intended that
Adkins's ideas be found to have met the standard of an invention when the previous

37

Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969).
at 668.
Id. at 672-73.

38 Id.
3
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court made the statement that Adkins's invention had made a significant
40
contribution to the art.
Although Lear is still good law, many exceptions have been carved out of it.41
For example, courts have distinguished the licensee situation in Lear from cases
involving assignors who later attempt to assert the invalidity of the patent
assigned. 42 The distinction is based on an equitable estoppel theory known as the
assignor-estoppel doctrine which states that an assignor who assigns "a patent or an
invention and a patent application for value [is estopped] from later contending that
the assigned property was valueless." 43 Thus, as the law currently stands, the Lear
doctrine (subject to the satisfaction of certain procedural mechanics) allows licensees
to challenge the validity of a licensed patent, whereas under the doctrine of
assignor-estoppel, one who assigns his rights cannot challenge the validity of a
patent-albeit that an assignor can challenge to force a court to determine the scope
of a claim.
Based on the foregoing, the CREATE Act forms an open question regarding
whether the defense of patent invalidity in an obviousness setting is still a viable
defense for patents subject to a "joint research agreement" when the prior art is
developed by a party to the joint research agreement. First, the mechanics of the
CREATE Act by definition will provide an admission (if not a strong presumption)
that the patent is obvious in light of the prior art. By amending the patent
application as set forth in § 103(c)(2)(C), the public will have notice of the parties
subject to the "joint research agreement" and notice that an obviousness rejection
was made. 44 Also, the Information Disclosure Statement should contain the § 102(e),
45
(f) or (g) disclosures since they are required as material to patentability.
The question presented in the above paragraph now becomes two questions, and
the need for answers to these two questions is a matter of policy. First, under the
assignor-estoppel doctrine, are parties subject to a "joint research agreement" giving
rise to a patent estopped from asserting patent invalidity based on obviousness?
Second, is there any party who can, despite the CREATE Act, assert invalidity
through obviousness based on subject matter that was developed through the same
"joint research agreement" as the claimed invention?
Answering these questions requires the balancing of fundamental policies of
patent law and contract law. Based on the fundamental purpose of federal patent
40 See id. at 676.
41 See Nellie A. Fisher, The Licensee's Choice: Mechanics of Successfully ChallengingaPatent
Under License, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 31-32 (1997).
42 See generallyJohn W. Schlicher, Lear v. Adkins Allegory, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 427 (1986); Tipton D. Jennings IV & Carrel L. Bryan 11, The Ever Expansive Scope ofLear v.
Adkins: Does It Have Limits? 59 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 679 (1977).
43 Q.G. Prods., Inc. v. Shorty, Inc, 992 F.2d 1211, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court went on to
say that "[i]n Diamond Scientific, this court applied the estoppel doctrine in the face of credible
invalidity evidence: 'The fact is that [the assignor] assigned the rights to his invention, irrespective
of the particular language in the claims describing the inventions when the patents were ultimately
granted."' Id. at 1214 (citation omitted). Thus, this court's analysis is not limited to the claims of the
'377 application. This court also noted that the "assignor could present evidence of prior art to
narrow the scope of the claims." Id.
44 Presumably, if no § 103 rejection was made during prosecution, the specification would not
have to be amended. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(2)(C) (2000).
4, See 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (2005).
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policy it is proffered that the equities should favor patent principles over those of
contract law.46

IV. FEDERAL PATENT POLICIES

A. HistoricalPrinciples
The four best-known positions on which advocates of patent protection for
inventors have rested their case may be characterized as the "natural law" thesis, the
"reward-by-monopoly" thesis, the "monopoly-profit-incentive" thesis, and the
"exchange-for-secrets" thesis. 47
Two major theses have resurged over the last several decades. The first is the
reward-by-monopoly thesis, "which assumes that justice requires that a man receive
reward for his services in proportion to their usefulness to society, and that, where
needed, society must intervene to secure him such a reward." 48 The reward, as the
name suggests, is a monopoly in the form of a patent that will grant the inventor the
right to exclude others from making, selling and using the invention for the life of the
patent. Once the patent expires, the invention is dedicated to the public.
The second, the monopoly-profit-incentive thesis,
assumes that industrial progress is desirable, that inventions and their
industrial exploitation are necessary for such progress, but that inventions
and their exploitation will not be obtained in sufficient measure if inventors
and capitalists can hope only for such profits as the competitive exploitation
49
of all technical knowledge will permit.
The premise of this thesis is that the venture, if successful, must be worth the risk.
"The simplest, cheapest, and most effective way for society to hold these incentives is
50
to grant temporary monopolies in the form of exclusive patent rights in inventions."
These principles have been recognized even since the time of the Classical Greek
empire.

46 For the purposes of this article, we will assume that the public policy governing contract law
favors the Utilitarian Economic Theory, which teaches that the principles of contract law should be
designed to maximize the potential gains from transactions by facilitating the process of voluntary
trade. Contract law should be utilitarian and based on free market principles. See gene-rally
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979). This
"view has become increasingly influential in recent years and is championed by a number of
academics and jurists associated with the 'law and economics movement.'
BERENDT ET AL.,
CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE 7-8 (1998).

47 Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System: Hearing Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judieiary,85th Cong. 2d
Sess., 21, 44-45, 50-54, 79-80 (1958).
48 Id. at 21.
49 Id.

5oId.
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The Sybarites having given loose to their luxury, made a law that.., if any
confectioner or cook invented any peculiar and excellent dish, no other
artist was allowed to make this for a year; but he alone who invented it was
entitled to all the profits to be derived from the manufacture of it for that
time; in order that others might be induced to labour at excelling in such
pursuits . . . . 51
Two thousand years later, these principles were still alive.
Galileo Galelei in Venice as the inventor of a machine for raising water and
irrigating land with small expense and great convenience, petitioning the
Doge of Venice for a grant what was called a "privilege," giving him and his
heirs, and those he might license, the sole right to make and use his
machine, saying in his petition: "it not being fit that this invention, which is
my own, discovered by me with great labor and great expense, be made the
52
common property of everyone."
Inventors wanted a reward for the fruits of their labor. In addition, the
members of society recognized that innovation was essential for the steady growth of
society itself. Lawmakers responded by implementing a patent system, which has
developed into our current statutory scheme.

B. CurrentStatutoryPolicy
In 1952, Congress enacted the current version of the Patent Act. The Patent Act
of 1952 was the first to introduce § 103. In the seminal case of Graham v. John
Deere Company of Kansas City, the Supreme Court held that the 1952 Act "was
intended to codify judicial precedents embracing the principle [announced by
Supreme Court in 1851]."

53

In coming to this holding, the Court discussed the

meaning of the newly enacted non-obviousness provision:
Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a condition which
exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by
reason of decision of the courts. An invention which has been made, and
which is new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before,
may still not be patentable if the difference between the new thing and
what was known before is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a
54
patent.

51 Giles S. Rich, The "Exclusive Right" Since Aristotle, Address At the Foundation for a
Creative America Bicentennial Celebration-United States Patent and Copyright Laws (May 9,
1990).
52 Jd
5 383 U.S. 1, 1 (1966).
54

Id. at 14.
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The court then investigated the congressional purpose behind § 103 and
concluded that § 103 was intended to codify the existing patent law precedent
55
regarding obviousness as a prerequisite to patentability.
In 1979, another case presented policy questions with respect to the purpose
behind the Patent Act. In Application of Bergy,56 Judge Rich used an analogy of
unlocking doors to obtain a patent:
Achieving the ultimate goal of a patent under those statutory provisions
involves, to use an analogy, having the separate keys to open in succession
the three doors of section 101, 102, and 103, the last two guarding the
public interest by assuring that patents are not granted which would take
from the public that which it already enjoys (matters already within its
knowledge whether in actual use or not) or potentially enjoys by reason of
57
obviousness from knowledge which it already has.
While discussing the third door of patentability (§ 103), the Court quoted a
House report stating that "[i]f this difference is such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time [the invention was made] to a person
58
[ordinarily] skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented."
As can be seen from the long history of common-law obviousness as well as the
statutory provision of § 103 first enacted in 1952, the obviousness inquiry is vital to
the progress of the useful arts, and circumvention of this inquiry-via contracts
which the CREATE Act would permit-would undermine the long-standing policies
of the patent laws.

V. CONCLUSION

The CREATE Act has amended § 103 to expand the definition of common
ownership with regard to certain types of prior art. The focus of congressional intent
was to promote research among inventive entities. In reality, Congress has relaxed
the conditions for patentability to the point where an obviousness inquiry can be
circumvented via contract. This is the epicenter for a substantive shift in federal
policy favoring contracts over patents.
As patents that are subject to the CREATE Act are enforced against the public,
the foundations of several legal doctrines will be tested.
The doctrine of
licensee-estoppel as articulated by the Supreme Court in Lear may be carved down
even further or abolished altogether. Invalidity of a patent based on obviousness as a
defense to a claim of infringement may become obsolete.
When a controversy arises, we should be reminded that the grant of a patent is a
reward to the inventor for something new and useful and not the result of
relationships carefully crafted via contract. In time, hopefully the Courts will require

55Id. at 17.

56In the Matter of the Application of Malcom E. Bergy, eta., 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
57Id. at 960 (emphasis added).
58Id. at 962 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, 2d Sess., at 4 (1952)).
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that inventors not only pass through three doors but also unlock those doors before a
patent is granted.

